The philospher speaks

Once upon a time there was a philosophers' weekly discussion. It was a cold winter day, years ago.

Just some dusty words, just some very weak ideas. Suddenly a philosopher raised the theses, the famous face of Arcimboldo, consisting of vegetables, had to be judged as a totally different system of symbols as a word. That because of this: If you took away the vegetables, the face would be away. Never more this face, not without vegetables!.

But one of the other philosophers just laughed. Without letters there wouldn't be the word, too.

A third philosopher just thought. Later he painted. Two mixed up pictures were created.

No more vegetables in the face, no more language-like letters in the word.

But nevertheless both pictorial subjects are still there. We could even reconstruct the original pictures and describe how they became what they are now. Based on our knowledge about digital reproduction of pictures and alphabetical signs we could even judge with a kind of justification, that the modified mixed up pictures are modifications of specific original pictures. These judgements could be false, of course. Especially we would be justified to judge: "I guess because of my knowledge about digital reproduction that these modifications are modifications of Archimboldos vegetable-face and the word Guiseppe Archimboldo". But this statement isn't able to be falsified, in contrast to "These modifications are modifications of Archimboldo's vegetable-face and the word 'Guiseppe Archimboldo'".

Well, both judgements are quite similar, the first one just more friendly presented, both sufficiently reducable to each other, what was enough to let the falsifiability of judgements in art go, when the philosophers met again later. But, one suggested, the modified word could be classified as belonging to a language and not the other symbol? But as we can regard the process of digital modification, we can classify the changed picture as well as the deformed word. There are always some cases not easy to be judged as belonging to anything, in pictorial arts as well as in language based on words: Is "Sachz" an acceptable name for a man in german? And "Sachzi" the female version? In the end, we'll continue to modify....

Both of these pictures could be classified as belonging to different symbol systems. They have aspects of graphical, non-alphabetical systems.

But on the other hand they are presented in and built upon disjunctive and identifiable schemas.

The mixture of colours has been created through processes of colour substitution, the special place on the picture identified with mask and numbered point. These were as identifiable in the formal system as similar in the reproduction.

The coloured point is reproduced, as it is, in an ideal, digital system with an infinite number of disjunctive classes, like on a field structured with a net of reell numbers. As such, the difference between what we call digital and analog will vanish. The judgement,

that exactly colour point xy is reproduced, can be better argued for in such a system than in any other - the reell numbers in the reell-numbered colour schema fit or don't.

Especially because of this, we guess, is a schema a real analogue schema if and only if we are looking on an individual, unique, chance given diversification of pigments.

Yes, but... We might argue now the other way round. If an anlogue schema has to be something not digital and just unique chance-given distribution of natural colour, we might dislike it for being such unrecognizable distributed.

Everybody will admit, that he or she isn't capable of judging reproductions or reproduce a special colour point like a qualified machine, perhaps even working with the same materials like the reproduced object has. We'll reproduce such a colour point exactly just by chance or just as seeming similar on the surface. Technicians of pastel, oil, acrylics of course know, how they have to design a colour field, putting one layer on the other, again and again, untill the difference is unjudgable and the impression of difference, like the similarity is how we have suspected them to be. But as poor as we judge the difference, we judge the similarity. The artist who reproduces his own monochrom pigment field, won't work for the goal to reproduce exactly, but exactly on the counterpart, to let the field give the impression not to be judgable, but the picture or his reproduction to be similar enough nevertheless.

Let's have a look at this picture in our thoughts: Just canvas and three paint brushes, the colour heavily watered. The colour will diversify in an undetermined way on the canvas, sometimes more replete, sometimes less intensive. Now we demand, that the artist should reproduce his work.Painting is his or her job, as such, no problem.

We even allow that the paint brush, in his first version rude and accidently, is reproduced with another, more sophisticated technique.

But the colour aspects and the intensity have to stay the same form the original to the reproduced. I'm sure, this reproduction will perhaps be something that fits, that is fine, very fine or unbelievable fitting. Perhaps the reproduction will be better than the reproduced work. But, nevertheless, as reproduction it will be worse than an ideal digital one. A machine will take every point and reproduce without noticing and thinking about it. But an artist will always judge. And although we well know, that a really exact reproduction of (nearly) all unique points, as far as we use the same materials, will convince us and won't be "too exact" (but the sum of its parts), is the hand-made depending man in front of his artwork not in anyway in the position - respecting his capabilities - just to notice a unique point. Not to talk about reproducing it with the certainty in judgements of similarity a machine has.

What visitors have fancied for long times in museums, that they aren't capable to recognize and identify details in monchrom arts but are able to feel the freedom of unreproducability in front of these pictures, all that belongs to the anchestors of their admired masters, too. The diversified monochrom field, deepness in monochromy, is well known rhetorics of the pastose paint brush. We can conclude that, like the artist couldn't reproduce his work, it has be produced by a mixture of menkind's calculus, experience in impression, tricky layering and a lot of chance. This is true for Barnett Newman as for a heaven done by the hand of Michelangelo, or the dark fields of soft lightened walls in Rembrandt If we transfigure these aspects of uniqueness, we'll mystify the weakest property of art: The "Well, it fits." - weak, even if claimed by a master and judged on the ground of his experienced eyes. What to do, if the master has failed? If he has misjudged the similarity of his colourpoints? Or the difference? And the small colourfield he judged to be similar in its colour, isn't, if you try to proof its similarity with machine x and schema R2D2? But the picture "fits" nevertheless, the master continues to claim? Not respecting another colourfield in his picture, far more monochrom, as colour schema D2R2 easily proofs. Does it matter? Doesn't it? How to judge about it? We shouldn't have to ask.

The author: * Dr. U. & d. s. W. * Dr. Ulrike Ritter

German version: www.artou.de